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POLITICAL SCIENCE

The Politics of Integration in Europe

..

W. HARTLEY CLARK
Carleton College, Northfield
"The United States of Europe has begun," 2 wrote
one of the fathers of European integration, Jean Monnet, in 1955. He was referring to the fact that in the
European Coal and Steel Community there had come
into existence on an all-European level a new and unprecedented institution possessing governmental powers.
How much more true would his words have been after
the creation of the European Economic Community, the
Common Market, in 1957-a new community with jurisdiction over all European economic affairs and aiming
toward the creation of an all-European government?
Comm0n Market President Hallstein characterized the
first four years of the Common Market by saying it had
passed the "point of no return"8, i.e., that the forces
then set in motion would lead inexorably toward an
United States of Europe.
Not only is the Common Market today the embryo
of a new European government, its present institutions
may well be the actual framework in which the future
power of government over Europe will accumulate. The
internationally minded Europeans would prefer to have
it that way. In a recent address, President Hallstein said:
"The EEC is in no way a purely economic venture requiring it to be duplicated by a political venture . . .
From what has just been said of the political nature of
the European Economic Community, it follows that the
Commission is bound to adopt an unreservedly positive
attitude towards any extension of European unfication
to other fields than that of economic and social policy,
notably defense ... [and] foreign affairs ... ; in short,
to whatever comes under the heading of "political union" . . . it can legitimately be felt that such an extension ought to take the form of an enlargement and
strengthening of the existing Communities . . . 4
One can not grasp the politics of this new European
entity by merely reading the constitutional provisions of
the Treaty of Rome that founded the Common Market
in 1957. As Sorbonne professor Maurice Bye has recently put it:
"Europe cannot be viewed as a prize piece of architecture designed at Rome in a perfect treaty with ideal
lines. Europe will be the new scene of new conflicts between new powers. " 5
It is the purpose of the following passages to explain
what the new powers are, how they interplay, and what
kind of political order they are evolving toward.

New Powers: The new foci of power on the European
level are the political organs of the Common Market :
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the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the European Parliamentary Assembly. All three wish to augment their power, and all three are more or less devoted to the cause of European unity. The Council of
Ministers consists of one representative from each member government, but the weights of their votes vary according to the size of the governments on certain issues.
Its purview is the question of European integration in
all respects, economic• and political; and this is an important feature that the name "Common Market" tends
to blur. The decisions of the Council have the force of
law, and are reached according to a complex voting
system. Although at first most decisions required unanimous approval, the Rome Treaty provided for the
introduction later of a qualified majority voting scheme
whereby no great power could block a decision unless
it had an ally. 0
The Council occupies an important part of the time
of the corps of west European foreign ministers, who
spend better than half of their professional lives together, if not on Common Market business, then on
NATO or other organized European business. It is the
highest echelon of European statesmen below the headsof-state. Not only do the ministers have considerable
political power in their own right, but they are for the
most part internationally minded and want to promote
the Common Market's evolution. One misappraises the ministers if one views them as a brake
upon the Common Market, always to be feared by the
internationalists. They are more apt to plead the cause
of the Common Market to their home governments than
the other way around. Service in delegations to the
Common Market is a training ground for national civil
service advancement', moreover, not a burial ground for
men unwanted at the home capitals. The Council is
highly bureauocratized with permanent national delegations in Brussels numbering up to fifty each, including specialists that meet in sub-committees continually
to prepare decisions for the Council. These staffs are also
supporters of the Common Market.
For all their stature and intern'ationalism, the foreign
ministers are still confined to the limits of policy imposed on them by their home governments. The Council failed to agree on a common set of cereal prices in
March, 1963, for example, because Germany would not
lower and France would not raise prices far enough to
reach an accomodation. 7
The Commission consists of nine international civil
servants chosen jointly by the governments and including two each from the great powers and one each from
the small. It has influence over Common Market polThe Minnesota Academy of Science
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icy in that it drafts the original policy proposals and can,
if it wishes, present them to the Council on an all-ornothing basis. 8 As more regulations are adopted by the
Council, the Commission will, in its role as implementor,
emerge as an important administrative institution for
Europe. The Commissioners have fixed terms, but this
is merely a reserve device for ridding the Commission
of undesireables. The terms are ordinarily renewed, and
Commissioners resign in mid-term if they find better
jobs. They employ a secretariat of about 1,800.°
The Commission has often been misrepresented as a
body of "technocrats", heading a new sort of European
technocracy. 10 The Common Market is, on the contrary, no more a technocracy than any other political
entity in Europe. Commission President Hallstein clarified this matter in his oft-quoted statement, "We are
not in business at all: we are in politics." 11 The members
of the Commission have either entered that body from
the field of politics or have become politicians while
members.12 They have been ministers in their own governments, and they or their successors will be the ministers of the United States of Europe tomorrow. Each
heads a direction, or ministry, organized parallel to the
conventional national ministries: finance, foreign affairs,
agriculture, etc. They meet as a cabinet each week to
agree on policy and strategy, and the President of the
Commission bears somewhat the same relation to the
other Commissioners as does a national prime minister
to his cabinet colleagues.
The success of the Commission has depended heavily
on their ability to probe and prod the national ministries that have the ultimate power over Common Market
progress. For a period, however, there went along with
this political sophistication a tendency in the Commission to assume that somehow the Common Market
would escape the natural weaknesses of a new international organization. Driven on as it was by the initial
momentum of the Community's inauguration, the Commission was somewhat over-ambitious and over-confident; and when the momentum was checked in January,
1963, i.e., when British membership was vetoed, there
was a serious break in morale.
The European Parliamentary Assembly consists of
delegates chosen by the parties in each of the parliaments
of the member governments, according to the ratio of
party strength at home. Hence, there are large numbers
of Christian Democrats, Gaullists, and Social Democrats,
which caucus as international parties for the purposes
of the European Parliament. The influence of the Parliament is today largely indirect, because it holds no
legislative powers and may only advise or recommend
action by the Council or Commission-with one exception. It can remove the Commissioners from office. 1 3
The political importance of the Parliament today lies
chiefly in the personalities it includes: from the elderly
fathers of the movement for European unity to the
young, ambitious politicians for whom service with the
Parliament represents a political distinction . The influence of the parliamentarians is limited, however, by the
fact that the national parliamentary leaders can not afProceedings, Volume Thirty-one, No. 1, 1963

ford time to be members of the European parliament.
Members spend from one to three quarters of their time
on European parliamentary business, a situation that
limits the possible impact of European parliamentarians
on their home parliaments. The European Parliament
campaigns constantly fo r an increase in its power; but
it is, in a more basic sense, biding its time and perfecting
its procedures in anticipation of the day when it becomes a real parliament with compulsive powers derived
either from its existing power to remove Commissioners
( a power of little value until the Commissioners become
themselves more important) or with the establishment
of some new basis for power.
As one views the three political institutions of the
Common Market together, they appear to form a constitutional oligarchy, the Council of Ministers being the
oligarchic rulers, the Commission their body of chief
clerks, and the European Parliamentary Assembly their
sounding board for popular grievances. In a primitive
political framework such as this, democracy is only
a remote ideal.
The Interplay of Forces: Although today there is a distinct hierarchy of power among the political bodies of
the Common Market, there are tendencies emerging in
the interplay of new forces that suggest that the present
arrangement of power is only transitional. These tendencies are reminiscent of the evolution of British government during the eighteenth century. 14 The British
monarch, once supreme in his realm, came to be dependent upon his cabinet in order to manage the Commons; and subsequently the Commons forced the cabinet to be responsible to it. In the case of the Common
Market, as the Council of Ministers gains more decisionmaking discretion, it confers more power and responsibility on the Commission; and, as the Commission
gains a stronger footing, the European Parliament will
hold it more strictly to account.
The Council of Ministers is drawing decision-making
authority away from governments in two ways. First, on
a slow cumulative basis, the Council is enacting Common Market policies, like its anti-trust regulation of
1961, that will henceforth be outside the hands of the
governments. Secondly, while passing through the prescribed steps in establishing the Common Market, the
Council is gaining new power to act by majority vote,
hence limiting governmental authority in a general way,
i.e., an unwilling government can be bound to a policy
adopted by majority vote of the Council.
The transmission of authority via the Council to the
Commission is now just getting under way. The initial
behavior of the Commission toward the Council of Ministers was timid. Although the Commission had the
power to refuse the amendment of draft proposals they
did not want changed by the ministers, they were in
fact very solicitous of the ministers and amenable to
change. Even rather early, however, the Commission exerted some of its authority when it slashed to a minimum
the number of national exceptions to be allowed from
new tariff reductions.
41

The general co-operativeness of the Commission was
necessitated by the initial tendency of the ministers to
avoid decisions. Although carrying through the tariff
disarmament agreed to in the Rome Treaty, the Council
dwelt so long over such matters as setting up the Commissions office that it was only ready to pass its enabling "legislation" in the fields of anti-trust and farm
policy at the last minute before agreeing to allow the
Common Market to graduate into its "second stage".
In fact, the ministers were half a month late, and there
was a possibility at Christmas, 1961, that the Common
Market would be a failure. Being allowed to pass into
the second stage was immensely heartening to the Commission, which proceeded to map out an ambitious
schedule for future policy making, only to lose momentum once more over the blocking of British entry into
the Common Market. Throughout the Gaullist period
in France the Commission and Council of Ministers had
accustomed themselves to French vetos and anti-European attitudes, but the Anglo-French stalemate at Brussels looked especially menacing. Nor did Germany promise to compensate for the new situation. Although the
President of the Commission was a protege of German
Chancellor Adenauer, the Chancellor was to be succeeded soon by Economics Minister Erhard, the political
foe of Adenauer and a man known to have limited expectations of the Common Market. The Council of Ministers remained, therefore, comparatively weak; and the
Commission could not yet insist on its full share of
decision-making power without injuring the Council and
the integration movement in general.
The Commission was accumulating administrative
powers, however, and these were beginning to assume
significant proportions. In administering the agricultural
regulations adopted by the Council in 1962, the office
of the Commission has been constantly fixing prices
and levies on European trade in food and is coming to
be relied upon in much the same way as a national agricultural ministry. Moreover, new administrative powers
are created continually for the Commission, as when
the Council authorized the Commission to take the requisite action should international migration drive up farm
real estate prices excessively, to cite a recent example
of February, 1963.15 One indication of the importance
of the Commission's power is the establishment of some
one hundred pressure groups in offices at Brussels, albeit that a number of them are promoted by the Commission itself as public relations aids.
Identifying the tendency for new power to be transmitted from the Commission to the European Parliament poses a difficult problem. Just as the Commission
has been slow to press the Council in recent years, the
Parliament has been slow to press the Commission, not
wanting to compromise the Commission's new-found
position of importance. Initially, the Commission and the
Parliament have been in league with one another. It
was no secret to the Commission that the Council regarded the Parliament with condescension, but the Commission-pursued the support of the Parliament diligently.
Although playing little role in the proceedings of the
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Parliament, the Commissioners attended faithfully and
tried hard to avoid unnecessary disagreements with the
parliamentarians, hoping in the end to have the Parliament's endorsement for the draft proposals of the Commission being readied for decision by the Council of
Ministers. So long as the Commission thought the Parliament was important, it was important, because the
wooing by the Commission gave the Parliament de facto
leverage where it was lacking in de jure legislative power
and impressed the Parliament's ideas on the work of
the Commission. Just recently the Commission conducted research into the breakdown of the Anglo-Common Market negotiations at the behest of the European
Parliament.1 6 The Commission's faith in the Parliament
is founded in the conviction that it is the best group
to lobby in the national governments, which are, in the
last analysis, in control of the members of the Council
of Ministers.
As the Commission grows in power, its tradition of
close consultation with the Parliament will act to transmit some of that power to the Parliament itself. More
important still, however, the Parliament's power to remove the Commission will gain real meaning once there
is some real decision-making power at stake in the Commission. Today, a rejection of the Commission by the
Parliament might seriously damage the whole effort for
European unity; tomorrow, a rejection of the Commission might make the Parliament clearly sovereign
within the international household. The Commission,
after all, has no power to dismiss the Parliament.
Once the Parliament has acquired material power, it
will become critically important to implement the provision of the Rome Treaty for the direct election of
Parliament, if the evolving governance of Europe is to
have a rigorously democratic quality; and the Parliament
itself is impatient for the direct election system to commence. Although there is no certainty that direct election now will actually increase the political stature of
the parliamentarians, the Parliament is driven to demand separate election by the mere physical impossibility
for its members to attend adequately to both their European parliamentary business and the business of their
national parliaments at home. Certainly at whatever time
direct elections become feasible and the issues faced by
the Common Market ate the ones of keenest interest to
the voting public, an electoral victory for a European
parliamentarian will confer upon him and his assembly
the most basic kind of democratic legitimacy and power.11

The Political Order of Integrated Europe : If the pattern of evolution mapped out above were to be followed
to a logical conclusion, the political organization of the
Europe of the future might look as follows : The Council of Ministers might come to play a role like that of
the Bundesrat in the German government, including as
it does the representatives of states. It would act on
Community measures just as the Bundesrat acts on German laws. The Commission may bifurcate, a tendency
it is already showing, with the President becoming both
The Minnesota Academy of Science
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the titular head of government and also the guiding
spirit of the executive cabinet, much like the Gaullist
presidency of France. The Council of Ministers may
well continue to choose the Commissioners, but as the
Parliament gains in strength, the Council may be forced
to choose, as a matter of course, the leaders of the principal party in the Parliamentary Assembly. Since the
Parliament has the power of removal, it could turn out
a group of Commissioners elected by the Council that
was not to its ( the Parliament's) liking. Thus the Commission would become responsible to the Parliament,
as is true of any parliamentary government; and, if the
Rome Treaty provision for popular election of the Parliament were implemented, a parliamentary democracy
would exist. All of the foregoing could take place without
formal change in any part of the present Rome treaty,
and the result could be a government composed of a
president, a responsible executive cabinet, and a twohouse legislature, one a federal house (the Council) and
the other a democratic house ( the Assembly). The Community already has its own court system.
It is possible that the burgeoning institutions of the
European Community will someday be set aside and a
new and scientifically designed constitution adopted for
an United States of Europe. Many years may pass, however, before such a reform could be possible; and during the interim the present Community institutions,
evolving along the lines just indicated, will establish a
European governing tradition that it will be difficult for
any constitution-writers of the future to discard.
NOTES
1

The characterizations of Common Market institutions contained herein are based upon interviews conducted at the headquarters of the organization 1961-1962 under a United States
government grant.
• Les Etats-Unis d'Europe ont Commence (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1955).
'"The European Economic Community," Address delivered
before the National Press Club, Washington, D.C., April 11, 1962.
'"Action Program, Second Stage of the Common Market,"
Common Market Reports (Chicago: Commerce Clearing House,
1963), pp. 12-13.
• "Comment une Authorite communautaire prend-elle de l'Authorite," Communaute europeenne (Paris), 7th year, No. 3, p. 10.
• Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Art.
148. There are seventeen total votes and twelve are necessary for a
qualified majority, while each great power bas only four votes.
' Le Monde diplomatique (Paris), No. 108 (1963), p. 18.
' Treaty, Art. 149. When the Commission insists upon the integrity of its proposal, it may be changed by the Council only by
unanimous vote.

Proceedings, Volume Thirty-One, No. 1, 1963

°Communaute economique europeenne, Commission, Cinquieme Rapport General sur l'activite de la Communaute, 1962,p. 344.
16
Pierre Drouin, "L'Europe doit imposer au monde un nouveau
'savoir-vivre' economique," Communaute europeenne, p. 11.
11
"Economic integration and political unity in Europe," Community Topics (London: Information Service of the European
Communities, 1961), p. 4.
12
Cf. biographies in Assemblee parlementaire europeenne, Annuaire-Manuel 1960-1961 (Luxembourg: 1961), pp. 161-165.
13
Treaty, Art. 144.
" Kenneth Mackenzie, The English Parliament (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1950), pp. 80-90.
"Le Monde diplomatique, Loe. cit.
10
ibid.
'' The quest for "legitimacy" is a problem for the Parliament
even now. Cf. Pierre-Olivier Lapie, Les Trois Communautes
(Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1960), pp. 218-219.
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